The role of food and agriculture in world afand diplomatically, food is a considerably fairs is an extremely broad and multifaceted subweaker diplomatic weapon than oil; third, he object. Attempts to understand it require the conserves the continued decline in the U.S. share of tributions of a number of disciplines, such as agagriculture in the world economy; and fourth, he ricultural economics, international trade and fiemphasizes the tarnished record of previous uses nance, history, and international politics. Thereof food diplomacy, and particularly, the recent fore, it is virtually impossible to do it justice in a Russian grain embargo. twelve-page manuscript or in a forty-minute preWhile there is some basis for the above argusentation.
ments, I do not feel that they inevitably lead to Joseph Coffey is to be commended for attemptthe view of a reduced role for food in the future ing to address the topic in the broadest possible world affairs of the U.S. Take first the changing way in order to account for not only the tradicharacter of international relations and the global tional economic factors, but also the political and food regime. Coffey seems to accept Hopkins cultural dimensions of world affairs. In his paper, and Puchala's conclusion that the AmericaCoffey focuses primarily on some speculations centered world food regime of the 50s and 60s is about the future role of food, and only marginally no longer operative, and that a new regime has that of agriculture, in the international affairs of emerged during the 1970s that presumably will be the United States over the next two decades. He with us for the remainder of the century. emphasizes that this future role depends to a
In my view, Hopkins and Puchala's old food large extent on the emerging set of rules and inregime is not gone, but is still with us and will stitutions governing the global food system and probably remain so for the foreseeable future. on the expected trends in world food demand and T. K. Warley has noted that "the United States availability. His conclusions are, as he calls is no ordinary country in world affairs. Its leadthem, paradoxical. While he envisions an inership (or acquiescence) is still decisive in decreased role for international affairs in U.S. agtermining the agenda for international discourse riculture, he also reaches the fairly pessimistic and action on world order issues pertaining to conclusion of a diminished role or influence of food and agriculture" (1978, p. 81) . The world food in the world affairs of the U.S.
food system is still America centered, and atMaking predictions on the future state of intertempts to disaggregate its center of power, either national relations is a hazardous undertaking.
through the New International Economic Order, While I do not claim to possess a clearer crystal multilateral food agencies, or internationally ball than does Coffey, I nonetheless have some sponsored agricultural research institutes, have questions concerning his assumptions and reaonly chipped away at, but not replaced, the old soning that have seemingly resulted in his food regime. paradoxical conclusions. Therefore, I will take It is true, for example, that the new food systhe opportunity to expand on a number of points.
tem now includes countries like China and the Soviet Union as major U.S. agricultural customers. But this fact has not in itself reduced Ameri-REDUCED ROLE OF AGRICULTURE ca's influence in world agricultural affairs. In-
IN U.S. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS?
deed, the influence of the U.S. seems to have been enhanced following the world shift to a sysCoffey reaches the conclusion that agriculture tem of floating exchange rates and the resulting will have a diminished impact on the internaemergence of U.S. agriculture as an important tional affairs of the U.S. on the basis of four main net exporter during the 1970s (Johnson, Schuh) . arguments. First, following Hopkins and It is precisely this widely held perception of an Puchala, he envisions a number of challenges to enhanced American influence in the world food the America-centered world food regime of the system, at a time of a perceived decline in overall past; second, he concludes that, both politically U.S. influence in international affairs, that has Emilio Pagoulatos is Associate Professor and Research Economist, Agricultural Market Research Center, Food and Resource Economics Department, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida.
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focused attention on food as an important foreign A case in point has been the emergence during policy instrument, the 1970s of the Soviet Union and other socialist Coffey makes a convincing argument that, economies as major markets for U.S. farm exboth politically and economically, food is a ports. The course of trade relations with nonweaker diplomatic weapon than oil. He correctly market economies has been mostly determined points out that wielding food power by the impoby political factors (Warley, 1976, pp. 824-25) . sition of embargoes may ultimately inflict greater
Restrictions on trade with Cuba, China, and the social costs on the imposing country than upon USSR were originally a means of conducting the its adversaries. He also demonstrates that U.S.
cold war. In turn, food sales to the Soviet Union agriculture possesses limited international leverwere viewed as an instrument of detente, leading age in attempting to increase export revenues to the expectation that progress in economic exthrough the formation of a food cartel.
change would encourage cooperation on other However, comparing food with oil does not matters. When, by the late 70s, this expectation give a conclusive answer about the strength of was not fully realized, it is not surprising that U.S. food power and whether this country can food sales to the Soviet Union were reevaluated exercise that power successfully in the future.
as an instrument of foreign policy. Given the hisNor does a demonstration of the inefficiency of tory of U.S.-USSR farm trade relations and the an embargo as a diplomatic weapon imply that its unstable power relations between the two coundiplomatic importance is nil, and that we will not tries, it is not unreasonable to predict that our see food used as a diplomatic instrument again in economic relations with the Soviet Union will the future. After all, history abounds with examcontinue being politicized in the foreseeable fuples of embargoes that failed to achieve their ture. stated objectives, from the U.S. Embargo Act of Finally, Coffey's additional argument, that the 1807, to the embargo against Italy in the 1930s, share of agriculture in the world economy will and against Rhodesia and South Africa in more continue to decline in the future, is easy to disrecent times.' Why then have boycotts, embarmiss. Agriculture has experienced a decline relagoes, and economic sanctions been resorted to tive to GNP throughout the twentieth century, over and over again, in spite of their ineffectual but this fact has not affected the role and influapplication?
ence of food and agriculture in international afThe answer to this question has to be found in fairs. Furthermore, what is of more importance the inherent political dimension of international here is the relative share of U.S. agricultural extrade relations. As Richard Cooper points out, ports in world farm trade. This share has grown trade policy has historically been very closely from 12 percent in the 1950s to about 17 percent linked to foreign policy. The only period during (Johnson) . If this trend persists, it will provide which foreign trade issues came close to being further arguments to the proponents of "food depoliticized was the 25-year span from 1945 to power" for years to come. 1970. Since the early 70s, however, foreign economic policy has become again the domain of foreign policy. The reason for this shift in foreign affairs according to Thomas Schelling is:"Aside INCREASED IMPACT OF WORLD AFFAIRS from war and preparations for war, and occa-ON U.S. AGRICULTURE? sionally aside from migration, trade is the most important relationship that most countries have Coffey foresees not only a lesser role for agwith each other;" hence, "trade policy is nariculture in the world affairs of the U.S., but also tional security policy," mainly because of "its an increased impact of international affairs on implications for other countries and our relations U.S. agriculture on the basis of his assessment of with them". (p. 737).
future trends in world grain demand, supply, and The implications for American agriculture of trade. These trends he forecasts on the basis of the trend toward increasingly politicized internaprojections he makes with the use of simple tional economic relations are far reaching. As the models of future grain demand and supply U.S. farmer has become more deeply involved in growth. an interdependent world food economy, his vulWhile I have little difficulty in accepting his nerability has increased not only as a result of underlying demand function, his choice of the uncertain world weather and economic condisupply equation raises some questions. In partictions, but also because of unstable power relaular, the definition of his productivity variable is tions between the major actors in the internanot spelled out, making an assessment of his estional political arena. Understanding internatimates difficult. Of course, projecting developtional affairs has become as important to his ments from the past into the future is always prosperity as predicting world market trends.
hazardous. Furthermore, projecting demand is a 'The U.S. Embargo Act of 1807 was of special importance to farmers in the South. As a result of the embargo, American farmers were particularly hurt because prices dropped with the loss of export markets for tobacco, cotton, and hemp. Even then, distress at home exceeded distress abroad without any apparent success of coercing the European powers. 2 Coffey's conclusion that U.S. food power will decline may still apply if food exports are not essential for survival, but are used to improve the quality of life.
relatively safer undertaking, as compared to that will guarantee its continuation into the fuprojecting supply developments. The uncertainture. ties involved in making supply projections are According to the principle of comparative addue, first, to the difficulty in forecasting technovantage, countries tend to export those goods logical changes, and, second, to the problem of that would be relatively cheap in the absence of obtaining reliable estimates of future availabiltrade, and to import those that would be relaities and costs of productive inputs such as land tively expensive. The ability of U.S. agriculture and energy.
to export or to compete successfully against imThese objections notwithstanding, I have little ports ultimately depends on two general sources disagreement with Coffey's conclusion that of comparative advantage: the cost competitiveworld food consumption will continue outstripness of U.S. products relative to its foreign riping world food supply in the foreseeable future.
vals, and the ability to differentiate the product This result is consistent with estimates obtained from its potential competitors. by other researchers (U.S. D.A.; Internatl. Food Competitiveness in terms of costs is a function Pol. Res. Inst.). It is also clear that the growing of factors such as dollar input costs, factor proworld gap between food consumption and productivity and innovation, and the terms of delivduction offers an obvious opportunity to U.S. ery, insurance, and credit. The ability to differagriculture to continue playing a vital world role entiate the product depends, in turn, on both obduring the 1980s.
jective and subjective product characteristics, Will American agriculture be in a position over and the seller's reputation and reliability. 3 Identhe next two decades to increase its share of tifying the key factors that explain U.S. agriculworld exports and thus play a role in closing the tural comparative advantage will provide a growing world food gap? Coffey attempts to proclearer picture of the future trade performance of vide an answer to this question by emphasizing the American farm sector. some supply constraints facing U.S. agriculture.
I conclude with a note that I feel could be of However, the emergence of U.S. agriculture as great importance to southern agriculture in the an important net exporter since the early 70s refuture. Comparative advantage does not imply flects, given U.S. and foreign government that a sector or a country is successful only in the policies and an appropriate exchange rate reexport business. The principle implies internagime, not only the overall levels of demand at tional specialization and the necessary expansion home and abroad and the relative availability of of imports along with exports. The U.S., and parsupply, but also the influence of comparative adticularly the South, is already facing increasing vantage, foreign competition in a number of commodities In my view, providing an answer to the above such as fruits and vegetables, dairy products, question requires also an examination of whether meat, and sugar. As farm exports continue to U.S. agriculture will retain its comparative adincrease as a result of comparative advantage, so vantage well into the future. Therefore, it is of will imports. The list of products that are great importance that agricultural economists inthreatened by foreign competition could easily vestigate the sources of U.S. agricultural comexpand. Eliminating this potential problem from parative advantage that emerged during the early our research agenda will not wish the problem 70s in order to understand the forces and policies away.
